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In their recent report on three deliveries with adverse out-
comes, Westerhuis et al.1 describe the clinical application of
the ST-analysis of fetal EG technology as an additional source
of information in fetal monitoring. The title of their article
and the conclusion imply that the method contributed to the
adverse outcomes. However, closer reading gives quite a dif-
ferent picture. In relation to case 1 the authors say:..‘ .
guidelines were not followed because they indicate immediate
deliveryin thecaseof a (pre)terminalCTG.Thiscase illustrates
the difﬁculty of classiﬁcation of the CTG.’ (p. 1199). About
case 2 they say ‘A preterminal CTG pattern. which should
havebeenacteduponat an earlier stage.’ (p. 1200) and about
case 3: ‘Perhaps the most important lesson from this case is
that one should continue to assess the CTG’ (p. 1200).
Whatis described in thethree cases is thus either asituation
with preterminal cardiotocogram (CTG) where no action was
taken or misinterpretation of CTG and/or the staff passively
awaiting an ST event.
The authors’ conclusion should come as no surprise: ‘The
most important limitation of ST analysis is deviation from
STAN clinical guidelines by labor ward personnel rather than
a fault in the technology’ (p. 1199).
Who then should be blamed? The monitoring technology?
The guidelines? The obstetrician? The midwife? What are the
reasons for inaction when action is called for and when both
the technology and the guidelines recommend action? With
hindsight it all seems illogical, and anyone who was not there
ﬁnds it difﬁcult to understand what happened. We fail to
appreciate that difﬁcult trade-offs are necessary when the
clinicians have to make their decisions in a busy, uncertain
and ‘noisy’ setting. The easiest way out is to blame technology
or the human involved. However, it is more interesting and
productive to start asking why, instead of who. Accidents or
adverse events are seldom the result of one single mistake, but
emerge from a host of factors.
How can we explain why the personnel did not apply the
methods of CTG interpretation that they and their senior
colleagues have practised since CTG was introduced in the
1960s. Why does the arrival of a technical device adding ST
analysis to CTG, make us behave like the onlookers who saw
their ﬁrst automobile? It is likely, of course, that problems
with CTG interpretation have always existed and that a bal-
anced, evidence-based assessment of its risks has not been able
to compete with our tendency to stick with established cus-
tomary practices. One wonders whether our resistance to
alternative technologies and practices and our overconﬁdence
in the effectiveness of traditional techniques (‘this is how
we’ve always done it’) may perhaps beneﬁt powerful regula-
tory, academic and industry interests at the heart of the devel-
opment of medical technology, which tend to inhibit
innovation.
Comparing what is going on in the delivery room to
another risky activity such as ﬂying immediately reveals the
huge difference between the amount of attention and resour-
ces put into the two. A whole science has developed around
risk and safety in aviation and it pays off. It is obvious that
adverse outcomes related to errors occur far more often in the
delivery rooms than in the air.Why is it so? Risk andsafety are
not areas of high priority in the delivery room even if risk
analysis and mitigation systems have been successfully and
systematically introduced in various local settings, for exam-
ple, in the UK (http://www.msnpsa.nhs.uk). Four decades of
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itoring with CTG have not even provided us with safe proce-
dures and a system memory of previous errors.
In a commentary linked to the article, Ingemarsson and
Westgren2 describe 12 Swedish cases from a 4-year period
illustrating what they term ‘false-negativity’, caused by
ST analysis, as an adjunct to CTG. Again the underlying
message is that technology has indirectly caused the adverse
outcomes. Investigations undertaken by the Swedish Board
of Health and Welfare in some of the cases have shown that
the adverse outcomes were caused by the staff not taking
action upon abnormal CTG patterns, misinterpretation of
the CTG and/or incorrect use of STAN because of lack of
proper training. In the same period during which Ingem-
arsson and Westgren report their 12 cases, many more cases
with adverse outcomes related to the use of CTG alone
occurred in Sweden. A recent Swedish study3 describes
CTG misinterpretation as the main issue in relation to ‘mal-
practice’. The authors conclude that fetal surveillance and
attention to signs of asphyxia must be improved. The situ-
ation is probably the same in the Netherlands from which
Westerhuis et al. reported the three case studies.
Electronic fetal monitoring (CTG) was introduced in the
1960s with the aim of decreasing perinatal mortality and
morbidity. The expected beneﬁts have only partly been
obtained and medico-legally, obstetrics has during the same
time period become both more dangerous and more expen-
sive for the professional. Defensive or even pre-emptive
intervention to avoid negligence claims is a reality. This is
not surprising and might even be acceptable if it actually
produced an effect on neonatal morbidity. But such an effect
has not been observed and cases of delayed intervention
or non-intervention with negative outcome obviously still
occur. CTG misinterpretation is one of the great risks in
the delivery room.4,5 Not striving to improve the situation
through additional or new methods is, of course, unethical.
ST analysis of fetal ECG is such an improvement. CTG will
always be a nonspeciﬁc method, currently dependent heavily
on subjective interpretation. Thus, the personnel (and the
fetus) remain at risk for wrong/delayed action as clear-cut
information is not available. Only with the addition of non-
subjective information will the risk decrease. Results from
the clinical use of automatic ST analysis is emerging, con-
ﬁrming that if used according to guidelines, CTG with the
addition of ST analysis of fetal ECG is superior to CTG
alone.6–8 However, the technology needs further develop-
ment such as online computer analysis to help avoid mis-
interpretation of CTGs; and, as with any other ﬁeld that
engages high-technology devices to support safety-critical
work, the need for regular training and systematic proﬁ-
ciency checking cannot be overemphasised. It should not
be seen as a problem of resources, but perhaps one of regu-
lation: a possible scenario is, for example, that no maternity
unit would be allowed to operate such technology without
a validated programme of initial staff training and regular
proﬁciency checks. Submitting to such scrutiny appears
much less of a problem in, for example, aviation, where an
entire professional career consists of a string of checks,
reviews, tests and more checks.
Adverse outcomes should drive exploration, reﬂection,
development and improvement, not retribution and ﬁnger-
pointing. The intensive study of organisational accidents over
the past 30 years consistently shows that attributing an ad-
verse event to a narrow proximal cause (technological failure,
human error) may give an illusion of understanding, but pro-
duces only sterile responses.9
The underlying but misguided idea is often that ‘human
error’ (by any other label: mis-assessment, misdiagnosis, mis-
use of an otherwise ﬂawless technology) is a satisfactory
explanation of failure. In contrast to this idea, we believe that
‘human error’ is something that demands an explanation.
Human error can never be the conclusion of an investigation
into an adverse event. Instead, it should be the starting point.
We should not see human error as the cause; but as a symp-
tom, an expression, of inadequacies deeper within the organ-
isational, technological and operational system that makes up
clinical work. If we really want to ﬁnd out what goes wrong
and how to improve it, we need to go beyond that ﬁrst,
apparently simple story that holds technological failure or
human error responsible. When we do such deeper investi-
gations, we discover much more complex patterns of clinical
practice and technological support that in some cases make
people excel and in other situations undermines their exper-
tise. It is in this underlying story that we can begin to discern
how clinicians handle difﬁcult situations under immense
uncertainty and ever-present time pressure, where different
technologies offer different mixes of capabilities and com-
plexities. It is here that we can begin to see how practitioners
cope with the complexities of their actual work (including
new technology), and from this we can learn. This is what
civil and military aviation have done.10 The call is for digging
deeper, in order to understand why, not to disperse guilt.
Traditionally, reactions to failure assume that safety gets
undermined by unreliable technology or by theunpredictable,
erratic assessments of human beings. But instead, studies of
clinicians and other safety-critical professions show how peo-
ple routinely create safety through practice by attuning and
enhancing their awareness of hazards and adapting their prac-
tices and technologies to guard against or defuse threats to
safety. Things go wrong when people’s ability to adapt suc-
cessfully is weakened, for example, by time constraints, inad-
equate training or goal conﬂicts and things will likely keep
going wrong if we rely on facile, superﬁcial explanations for
those failures. The greatest risk to safety in the delivery room
is not the technology, nor the human. It is oversimpliﬁcation:
the idea that there are simple explanations for adverse events
Amer-Wahlin, Dekker
936 ª 2008 The Authors Journal compilation ª RCOG 2008 BJOG An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecologyand single silver bullets that can resolve the situation is
an illusion. Our patients deserve deeper, more complex
explanations that take account of human behaviour—and
can lead to real improvements in practice. j
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